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Historias laborales incompletas y altamente fragmentadas amenazan con dejar a muchos 
contribuyentes de los regímenes de pensiones de América Latina sin la pensión mínima 
garantizada, o incluso sin acceso a la pensión (jubilación) común. En el presente estudio, se 
propone una metodología para evaluar este riesgo, identificar los grupos vulnerables y estudiar 
los posibles factores determinantes de las historias de contribuciones, utilizando la información 
de los registros de historia de laboral de las instituciones de seguridad social. Aplicando esta 
metodología sobre los registros de la principal institución de seguridad social del Uruguay, el 
Banco de Previsión Social, se obtiene que la mayoría de los contribuyentes de esta institución 
podría no cumplir con el mínimo de años de cotización requeridos actualmente para acceder a 
una pensión (jubilación) común al llegar a las edades habituales de retiro. 
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Incomplete and highly fragmented work histories threaten to leave many contributors of the 
pension schemes in Latin America without the minimum pension guarantee or even without 
access to the ordinary pension. We propose a methodology to assess this risk, identify 
vulnerable groups and study potential determinants of the history of contributions using 
information from the work history records of the social security institutions. We apply this 
methodology to the largest social security institution of Uruguay, the Banco de Previsión 
Social, and show that the majority of contributors to this institution might not comply with the 
minimum number of years of contribution that is currently required to access an ordinary 
pension when they reach the retirement age. 
 
Keywords: density of contributions, work history. 
JEL Classification: H55, J14, J26. 
  21  INTRODUCTION 
 
The low coverage of the social security systems in Latin America is a motive for concern. 
Coverage is low in many countries both among the elderly and the working population. The 
proportion of the elderly who are receiving pensions is a direct indicator of the effectiveness of 
the systems to provide income security in old age, but the proportion of the economically active 
population that is contributing is also important as it conditions the access to and the amount of 
future pensions. Like in other developing regions, large segments of the economically active 
population do not contribute to the pension system in Latin America (Gill et al. 2003; Auerbach 
et al. 2005; Rofman and Lucchetti 2006).  
 
While low participation of workers in the pension system is always a problem, the exact nature, 
causes and policy implications of the phenomenon are likely to be different depending on 
whether participation in social security is a permanent or a temporary status for each worker. 
Low aggregate coverage might arise because the population is segmented, with some workers 
contributing and other workers not contributing, or because many workers contribute only part 
of their working career. In the first scenario, those workers who are contributing to the system 
are basically protected and are expected to receive a pension. In the second scenario instead, 
there might be a considerable number of workers who would not be well protected despite of 
being registered as contributors. Therefore, it is not only the average rate of contributors in the 
population what matters but also the turnover. A similar issue has recently been raised about 
labor informality in Latin America. Perry et al. (2007) describe a pretty dynamic picture, where 
many workers transit between formality and informality. Bosch and Maloney (2006) analyze 
the transitions between salaried and self-employed workers in Mexico and show that there is 
indeed a significant turnover.  
 
Furthermore, the turnover of workers between contributing and not contributing is having an 
increasing impact on the access to pensions in practice as the social security administrations are 
increasing their capacity to control the fulfillment of the vesting period conditions. Not long 
ago, the social security administrations had almost no records of the individual contributions 
they had collected, and could not check whether workers had accumulated the years of 
contributions legally required to access a pension. Benefits were hence granted on a very 
informal basis, often appealing to the testimony of witnesses. Albeit difficult to prove, there are 
many informal tales suggesting that having connections in the social security institutions and in 
the political system was also helpful to get a pension in some countries. It is no wonder then 
that many people managed to get a contributory pension even when they had not contributed 
the required number of years. This state of affairs is gradually changing in several countries in 
the region as the social security systems started to build work history records as part of the 
reforms that took place in the eighties and nineties. Social security administrations are 
increasingly being able to check individual records of contributions, leading to a better 
enforcement of the conditions to access to pensions. These are mostly good news, but there is 
also a risk that many workers do not adapt to the new conditions and end up with a very low 
pension or no pension at all. Aware of this risk, several governments in Latin America are 
currently considering options to reduce the number of periods of contribution required to access 
a pension. In the case of Chile, for example, the reform that the government proposed to the 
parliament in 2007 eliminates the condition that workers had 20 years of contribution to access 
  3the minimum pension guarantee. Colombia is also considering a reform that would reduce the 
vesting period (the so called Beneficio Economico Periodico or periodic economic benefit). 
Options to soften this requirement are also in the agenda of the social security authorities of 
Uruguay. 
 
Some social security institutions have recently delivered samples of the work history records 
and some other institutions will probably follow their way in the near future. These rich and 
large panel datasets can in principle be used to assess the proportion of workers who could 
reach the required periods of contributions at the retirement age, but the available histories are 
still partial, usually about 10 to 15 years long. In this paper, we present a methodology to assess 
the access to pensions building life-time work histories from incomplete histories and present 
results for the case of Uruguay. The paper aims to answer several questions. How many 
workers will not comply with the years of contributions required to access a pension at ordinary 
retirement ages? Which are the most vulnerable groups? What factors condition the probability 
that a worker accumulates the required years of contribution at the usual retirement ages? 
 
We applied our methodology to a database of the work history records of the largest social 
security institution of Uruguay, the Banco de Prevision Social (BPS). We found that, unless 
there is a significant change in the patterns of contribution in the future, compared to the period 
in which the sample was taken (1996-2004), a vast majority of the contributors to this 
institution will not comply with the years of contribution that are required to access a pension. 
Our results show that the situation will be particularly severe among low income workers 
working in the private sector. These gloom projections seem to be at odds with the 
comparatively high coverage that the old-age pension programs have achieved among the 
elderly in Uruguay. But it should be noticed that the current levels of coverage were achieved in 
a period in which the BPS was not really able to enforce the periods-of-contribution condition 
to access to pensions. This was so because of the lack of work history records. This situation is 
gradually changing as the institution accumulates records of contribution.  
 
The literature that analyzes access to pensions in Latin America has used a variety of concepts, 
data sources and methodologies. The most widely used data source is the household survey. 
Analysts have long been using this data to compute coverage of the labor force as the 
proportion of the economically active population that contributes to the social security system. 
Rofman and Lucchetti (2006) provide extensive computations of this and related indicators 
across several Latin American countries and explore the links between the rate of coverage and 
several key socio-economic characteristics (like education, sector of activity, size of the firm, 
etc.). Using the same data source, several researchers have used qualitative dependent variable 
models to estimate the probability that workers contribute to social security and to analyze what 
factors impact on this probability (Auerbach et al. 2005; Barr and Packard 2003; Barrientos 
1996 and 1998; Bustamante and Paola 2006; Holzmann et al. 2000; Li and Olivera 2005; 
Packard et al. 2006; Packard 2001; among others). The household surveys are rich data sources 
but they only provide cross section information at individual level, so these surveys are not 
suited to the type of questions we aim to answer. Besides, some household surveys provide 
information about affiliation to social security but not about actual contributions. It has been 
reported in several countries in Latin America that the number of affiliates is significantly 
larger than the number of effective contributors at any point in time. 
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looking at the individual density of contributions, i.e. the proportion of lifetime that each 
worker contributes to social security (Bertranou and Sanchez 2003; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2004; 
Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta 2004; Bucheli et al. 2005 and 2006; Bravo et al. 2006; Berstein et 
al. 2005 and 2006). Building on this literature, we use in this paper survival analysis to model 
the transitions between contributing and not contributing. Survival analysis allows us to adopt 
more flexible assumptions than those adopted in the literature mentioned above to address this 
issue. We then use the transition rates to simulate the complete work histories of hypothetical 
workers using Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
In the next section, we present a brief summary of the Uruguayan pension system. We describe 
the data in section 3. In section 4 we present the methodologies for the estimation of the hazard 
rates and the simulation of the work histories. The main results are reported in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes. 
2  THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN URUGUAY 
 
Before the social security reform initiated in 1996, the Uruguayan retirement system relied on a 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system financed through payroll contributions paid by employers and 
employees. Contribution was also mandatory for self-employed workers who were subject to 
minimum declared earnings. A public institution, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), 
administered four large programs that covered public servants, private workers (with some 
exceptions), rural workers and domestic workers. In addition, some categories of workers had 
their own special pension schemes: bank employees, notaries, self-employed university 
graduates, armed forces personnel, and police force personnel. By 2001, the number of 
contributors to the BPS represented 89% of the total number of contributors to all social 
security institutions in the country (Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza 2004).  
 
In 1996, a reform modified the BPS programs introducing individual savings accounts to 
complement the PAYG system. Workers with wages below a threshold continue to be served 
by the PAYG regime administered by BPS unless they explicitly choose to deposit half of their 
contributions in a personal account. Workers with higher wages must contribute to both pillars. 
For the amount below the minimum they contribute to the PAYG public system and from there 
up to a certain maximum, also established by law, they must contribute to individual accounts. 
There is no mandatory contribution for earnings over the established maximum. Employers’ 
contributions go exclusively to the public PAYG pillar. 
 
The reform introduced other modifications, mainly with the aim of strengthening the link 
between contributions and pensions, and postponing the retirement age. The minimum 
retirement age was fixed at 60 for men and women, which meant an increase of 5 years for the 
latter. Also, the minimum number of years of contribution required to access an ordinary 
pension was raised from 30 to 35. Workers can receive a contributory pension with only 15 
years of contribution, but this benefit is smaller than the ordinary pension and eligibility is 
restricted to individuals who are 70 years or older. Workers with hazardous occupations and 
other special categories have special bonus on their count of years of contribution. 
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of contributions, in order to induce longer working-lives. Before the reform, the replacement 
rates ranged from 65% to 80% for women and from 60% to 80% for men. The reform 
eliminated gender differences and the replacement rate now ranges from 50% to 82.5%, 
depending on the years of contribution and the retirement age. The average wage used in the 
benefit formula was modified to include a longer period of contributions. In addition, there is an 
extra bonus for low-income workers who choose to contribute to individual savings accounts. 
 
Persons who do not satisfy the requirements to access a contributory pension may be eligible 
for a means-tested pension program. With the reform, the minimum age required for this benefit 
was raised from 65 to 70. 
 
The reform also established the systematic registration of workers’ labor history. Before that, 
insomuch as these administrative records did not exist, the control of the actual years of 
contributions was very difficult and done on very informal bases, such as the testimony of 
witnesses. 
3  THE DATA 
 
We used a random sample of the work history records of the BPS, collected in December 2004 
by the Labor History Unit of the BPS (ATYR-BPS). Workers in the sample were between 18 
and 70 years old and contributed at least one month between April 1996 and December 2004. 
The sample has 68,997 individuals. 
  
The records are organized in five databases. One file gives personal information on individuals: 
date of birth, sex and country of birth. Another file reports about the job of each person, 
particularly the date of initiation of activity and the explicit end of the link between the worker 
and the firm. A third file reports monthly information about the contributions. In particular, we 
have information on wages and some characteristics of the job. Also, there is a database 
reporting information about benefits that allowed us to know the date of retirement. Finally, 
there is a database that provides information on firms’ characteristics (size, industry, etc.), but 
we do not use it in this paper.  
 
Table 1 shows the number of individuals in the database by cohort, gender and private/public 
condition. The gender composition is quite similar to the one found by Bucheli (2004) based on 
the Household Surveys. Specifically, there are 37,822 men (55%) and 31,175 women (45%). 
We considered as public worker everyone who had worked in the public sector for at least half 
of the total time he or she had contributed. According to this criterion, we identified 58,617 
(85%) private and 10,380 (15%) public workers in the database. While public sector 
contributors are evenly distributed between sexes (51% are women), private sector contributors 
are predominantly men (44% are women). 
 
The database contains two variables that report the beginning and end of the job spells. The 
spells may include some non-working periods –like low season in the case of seasonal workers 
or workers on sickness or maternity leave–, which are computed for contribution purposes.  
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called “density of contributions”. This variable measures the proportion of months that a worker 
contributed over the potential months he could have contributed. The average density of 
contributions is 60% in our sample. Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta (2004) report a density of 
contributions significantly higher, of around 75%, between January 1997 and December 2003. 
They used a sample of the workers registered in the labor history records of the BPS which was 
collected in the second semester of 1996. This collection choice has problems given that it loses 
all the workers who entered the database afterwards. In addition, workers with intermittent 
activities in the BPS and lower densities of contribution are less likely to be included in their 
sample than workers with higher densities of contributions. As a result, their calculations on the 
density of contributions are biased-upwards. 
 
The distribution of the density of contributions has two modes and is strongly asymmetric, 
characteristics also pointed out by Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta (2004). A similar pattern has 
been reported in Argentina (Farall et al. 2003; and Bertranou and Sánchez 2003). In our sample, 
28% of the workers contributed 100% of the period. This was the most frequent density of 
contributions in the database. Besides, over 40% do not register contributions for at least half of 
the potential months of contribution (Table 2). 
 
Men present higher densities of contribution than women. Indeed, on average men contributed 
61.4% and women contributed 58.0% of the time.  
 
As expected, public sector workers have significantly higher densities of contribution than 
private sector workers. On average, public sector workers contributed 85.4% and private sector 
workers contributed 55.3% of the time. While more than two thirds of public employees 
contributed the whole period, only 21% of private employees contributed that much. Moreover, 
a significantly smaller proportion of public than of private workers contributed less than half of 
the time. There is however a considerable number of individuals classified as public employees 
who present low densities of contribution. This unexpected result responds in part to the 
classification as public employees of workers who contributed only part of the time as public 
employees. Also, this estimation does not correct for those activities with special bonuses, i.e. 
activities that compute more than one year of contribution per every year of actual contribution. 
This is the case of most teachers. 
 
Additionally, we grouped the individuals in the sample in quintiles of the earnings distribution. 
In order to avoid the circular reasoning of finding low densities for workers whose low average 
income is due to few periods of contribution, we calculated the average earnings over periods in 
which individuals reported strictly positive earnings. Then, we grouped five-year generations 
workers by sex and we calculated the quintiles of the earnings distribution for each group. The 
average density of contribution consistently rises with the quintile of these distributions. Indeed, 
the average density of contribution is almost 38% for the poorest quintile and more than 80% 
for the richest quintile. 
 
There are also significant differences according to individuals’ age. At 20, the density of 
contribution is about 30% on average and it continuously increases with age, exceeding 75% 
when workers are in their fifties. However, there is an important dispersion for individuals of 
the same age, as it is shown in Table 3.  
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The business cycle seems to have had a significant impact on the density of contribution. The 
Uruguayan economy began a recession in 1999 which was followed by the most severe 
economic crisis in the country’s history. The recovery began slowly in 2003, and 2004 was 
already a year of significant growth. This evolution is reflected in the unemployment and 
employment rates observed between 1996 and 2004. In this period of significant 
macroeconomic volatility, the density of contribution mirrored the rate of employment (figure 
1).  
 
4  METHODOLOGY 
 
We want to estimate the proportion of workers who would reach the number of periods of 
contribution required to access a pension at the normal retirement ages and to identify the most 
vulnerable groups. It is not possible to estimate this proportion directly though, partly because 
the conditions are changing and workers and firms also change their behavior, but also because 
we do not have full lifetime work histories in the region. With the incomplete work histories we 
have, it is not possible at the moment to directly estimate how many periods of contributions 
workers have accumulated when they reach the retirement age. We propose in this paper a two-
stage methodology to estimate the distribution function of the counting of periods of 
contributions along lifetime. In the first stage, we estimate the rates of transition (or hazard 
rates) between contributing and not contributing in each period along the lifetime. In the second 
stage, we simulate the lifetime work histories using the hazard rates estimated in the first stage 
and compute the distribution functions of the counting of periods of contribution at different 
ages.  
 
4.1.1  First stage: estimating the hazard rates 
 
Consider a worker who may be in any of two possible states: contributing and not contributing 
to social security. Depending on circumstances and his choices, the worker will be making 
transitions between these two states. Let  ( ) t c X t h ,  be the probability that a worker who does 
contribute to social security during month t stops contributing in t+1 and let   b e  t h e  
probability that a worker who does  not contribute to social security during month t starts 
contributing in t+1. These probabilities are the (discrete time) transition rates or hazard rates of 
the states “contributing” and “not contributing” respectively. The hazard rates may depend on 
several variables represented by X
( t n X t h , )
t.  
 
In order to identify the hazard functions, different alternative assumptions are usually made in 
the literature. The most common one is that the hazard rate can be decomposed in two 
multiplicative terms, one that summarizes the impact of duration in the state, the so called 
baseline hazard, and a term that summarizes the impact of the covariates Xt. This model has 
been called proportional hazard because the hazard rates of two individuals who differ only in 
time-invariant covariates maintain a constant ratio, which is in turn proportional to the absolute 
difference in the covariates.  
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specification (Jenkins 2005, pp 41-2): 
 
() ( [] t t t X X t h ) γ β + − − = ' exp exp 1 , 
 
where  t γ summarizes the baseline hazard. This model is known as the cloglog model, because a 
complementary log-log transformation of the hazard is a linear function of the baseline hazard 
and the covariates:  
 
() () [] t t t X X t h γ β + = − − ' , 1 log log  
 
An alternative identifying assumption that is often used in discrete time models is that the odds 
ratios are proportional to the absolute difference in the covariates. This assumption leads to the 
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where  t α summarizes the relative odds of making a transition when X = 0. 
 
In order to identify  t γ  and  t α in the cloglog and the logistic models, additional assumptions 
have to be made about the underlying functional forms. Lacking specific theoretical guidance, 
we adopted the usual practice of using dummies to represent duration  and age. Once the 
empirical duration and age patterns could be identified, we chose some more parsimonious 
functional forms to facilitate the simulations. We decided to use a polynomial of degree three 
on age and the log of duration. As the pattern of duration might vary along the life cycle, we 
included two variables of interaction between duration and age. 
 
The work history data set presents some characteristics that make the estimations of the hazard 
rates relatively complex. The data contains censoring and truncation, multiple spells and 
unobserved heterogeneity. We briefly explain how we dealt with each of these complications in 
what follows. 
 
A spell of contributions is expected to end when the worker transits from contributing to not 
contributing, but the observed spell can also end because of the end of the observation period. If 
this happens, we only know that the worker did not transit to the other state before the last 
period of observation but we do not know whether the worker made or made not a transit 
afterwards. This right censoring is not a major problem for the estimation of the hazard rates 
though. It is enough to acknowledge the fact that the only information we have about the last 
observation is that the individual survived in the state at least until that period.  
 
In our data set, right censoring occurs in two different cases. First, observations are censored at 
the end of the work history sample. We do not know the contributing state of any worker after 
December 2004. Second, a worker may die or retire during the period of observation. Death and 
retirement could be thought of as different states in the context of a competing risks model. In 
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contributing take value zero when the individuals die or retire.  
 
There is left censoring when the starting date is not observed. In our data, the spells of not 
contribution that began before April 1996 are left censored. We did not use these spells in the 
estimations. There is no left censoring of the spells of contribution in this data set. Even when 
the spell may have began before the initial observation date we have the information about 
when these spells began. 
 
There is truncation when some survival times are systematically excluded from the sample. Left 
truncation occurs when individuals who did not survive enough are excluded and right 
truncation occurs when individuals who survive too much are excluded. In our data set, there 
might be left truncation of the spells of contribution. The work history database captures all 
individuals who contributed at least one month between April 1996 and December 2004. 
Consider two workers who began to contribute say in January 1990, but one left one year later 
and never returned and the other one continued at least until April 1996. While the second 
worker will be registered in the social security database, the first worker with the shorter spell 
will be excluded.  
 
Unobserved heterogeneity may significantly bias these estimations. Over time, the proportion in 
the population of individuals with high risk of leaving the state declines. Thus, the average 
hazard rates of mixed populations tend to decline over time even if the “true” hazard rates of 
the individuals in the population rise. In order to reduce uncontrolled heterogeneity, we worked 
separately with several categories of workers whose behavior is likely to differ. We 
distinguished men and women, public and private workers and quintiles of the labor income 
distribution. For each category, we run formal tests of unobserved heterogeneity and controlled 
for the heterogeneity that could still remain modeling it as an individual effect. Assuming that 
the individual effects are normally distributed with zero mean, the hazard rates for mixed 
distributions can be estimated using random effects complementary loglog or logit models 
(Jenkings 2005, pp 84-5). We used the xtcloglog and xtlogit commands in STATA to estimate 
these models (Stata 2003). The program reports the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the individual effects is zero. Frailty is not important if this hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. Otherwise, frailty matters and the random effects estimation takes it into 
account. 
 
The strategy to model the probability of contributing used in this paper is more general than 
previous attempts we could identify in the literature (including our own previous work). The 
first studies on this subject that we could find assumed that the probability of contributing is 
independent of previous status, which is a strong assumption as Bucheli et al (2005) explicitly 
acknowledge (Bertranou and Sanchez 2003; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2004; Lagomarsino and 
Lanzilotta 2004; Bucheli et al. 2005; Bravo et al 2006). The assumption of independence 
actually amounts to assuming the following two hypotheses (i) the hazard rates do not depend 
on duration, and (ii) one minus the hazard rate of the state “contributing” equals the hazard rate 
of the state “not contributing”. These hypotheses not only look strong, but they can also be 
tested and so there is no need to just assume them as true. 
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the probabilities of contributing to depend on the previous period status (Bucheli et al. 2006). 
We dropped the assumption that one minus the hazard rate of “contributing” equals the hazard 
rate of “not contributing”, but we still maintained the not very appealing assumption that the 
hazard rates do not depend on duration in the state. This hypothesis was formally tested and 
systematically rejected in the framework proposed in this paper.   
 
4.1.2  Second stage: simulating the work histories 
 
Our final goal is to build empirical distribution functions of the number of periods of 
contributions at the usual retirement ages. This can be done analytically, if the probabilities of 
contributing each period are independent of previous period status, as we have shown in a 
previous study (Bucheli et al. 2005). But it cannot generally be done analytically when the 
probabilities of contributing depend on previous periods status and vary along the life cycle. In 
this case, work histories are determined by a non-homogenous Markov chain. We performed 
Monte Carlo simulations to overcome this difficulty.  
 
The simulation of the work histories entails building strings of “c” and “n” (for contributing and 
not contributing, respectively) that adequately replicate the stochastic properties of the observed 
incomplete histories. The simulated worker contributes in t if either he was contributing in t-1 
and did not make a transition to not contributing or he was not contributing in t-1 and made a 
transition to contributing. Let p represent the propensity to make transitions and let us assume 
that it is drawn from a uniform distribution in the [ ] 1 , 0  interval. The individual contributes in t 
if   and he was contributing in t-1, or if  ( 1 , 1 − − ≥ t c X t h p ) ( ) 1 , 1 1 − − − ≥ t n X t h p  and he was not 
contributing in t-1. With this rule, the probability that an individual who contributes in t-1 also 
contributes in t is  , which is the probability of not leaving the state 
“contributing”. The probability that an individual who does not contribute in t-1 contributes in t 
is  , which is the probability of leaving the state “not contributing”.
( 1 , 1 1 − − − t c X t h )
)
                                                
( 1 , 1 − − t n X t h
2
 
The above algorithm was applied to the lifetime of each simulated individual. The simulations 
began at age 18 in the state “not-contributing” and ended at age 70. The number of months of 
contribution accumulated at any age could then be counted in each simulated work history. 
Repeating this procedure many times, we got empirical distributions of the counting of the 
months of contribution at the desired ages.  
 
2 The conditional probability of contributing each month can be thought of as the probability of not leaving the 
state “contributing”, if the individual contributed the previous month, and as the probability of leaving the state 
“not contributing”, if the individual was not contributing the previous month. The former is one minus the (discrete 
time) hazard rate of the state “contributing” and the latter is the hazard rate of the state “not contributing”. In turn, 
the conditional probability of not contributing can be thought of as the hazard rate of the state “contributing”, if the 
individual was doing so in the previous month, and as one minus the hazard rate of the state “not contributing”, if 
the individual was not contributing in the previous month. 
  115  RESULTS 
5.1.1  The hazard rates 
 
We estimated the complementary loglog and logit models, getting very similar results. For the 
sake of brevity, we only present here the results obtained with the complementary loglog 
model.
3 The results are summarized in tables 4 to 11.  
 
The unemployment rate has a significant positive impact on the hazard rate of contributing and 
a significant negative impact on the hazard rate of not contributing for most categories of 
private workers. This is to be expected, as in periods of high unemployment workers stop 
contributing at higher rates because of job loss and transition to informality, and find it more 
difficult to get formal jobs. However, we do not find this pattern for men in the poorest quintile 
and women in the poorest two quintiles. Higher hazard rates of contributing and lower hazard 
rates of not contributing lead to lower densities of contribution during downturns. In the case of 
Chile, Bertsein et al. (2006) report that the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the 
density of contributions of men, but positive on the density of contributions of women. 
 
Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate does not impact on the hazard rates of contributing 
and not-contributing for most categories of public workers. However, some middle income 
public workers show lower hazard rates of contributing during recessions. A possible 
explanation for these contrasting patterns is that while private workers lose jobs during 
downturns, public workers choose not to quit when it is more difficult to find a job in the 
private sector.   
 
Age has an impact on the hazard rates of contributing and not-contributing as well. Young 
workers tend to have higher hazard rates of both contributing and not contributing than middle-
aged workers, implying that the turnover rates are particularly high at the beginning of the 
working career. Senior workers tend to show higher hazard rates of contributing and lower 
hazard rates of not contributing than middle-aged workers. This is to be expected, as senior 
workers are more likely to stop contributing and less likely to restart contributing after they 
stopped than workers who are in the middle of their working careers and have not yet arrived to 
the retirement age. 
 
In both states, the probabilities of making a transition reduce as the workers spend time in the 
state. Indeed, duration has a highly significant negative impact on the hazard rates of both 
contributing and not-contributing. In most regressions the coefficient for duration was found to 
be negative and different from zero at 0.1% significance level. The hazard rates drop initially 
fast and tend to stabilize for long durations. The estimated coefficient varies across categories, 
but it is worth noting that even in the public sector duration has a highly significant impact on 
the hazard rates.   
 
Young workers tend to have not only higher but also more resilient hazard rates than workers 
aged 30 to 59 years. Like their more mature fellows, young workers show decreasing 
probabilities of making a transition out of any of the two states as they spend time in the state, 
                                                 
3 The results obtained with the logit model are available from the authors upon request. 
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the case of workers aged 30 to 59. In other terms, duration has a higher negative impact on the 
hazard rates of contributing and not contributing when workers are between 30 and 59 years old 
than earlier in their lifetime. The coefficient of the variable that captures the interaction 
between duration and the dummy variable for age 30 to 59 is negative in all regressions and 
significantly different from zero at 0.1% significance level in most regressions. The pattern is 
less clear for senior workers (aged 60 and above): some categories present negative, some 
positive and some non significant coefficients multiplying the corresponding duration-age 
interaction variable. 
 
Table 12 provides some simulated hazard rates of contributing in a typical year, i.e. with the 
unemployment rate at the mean of the period. For instance, the average 40 years old man 
working in the private sector and belonging to the richest quintile has an expected hazard rate of 
about 3.8% in the first month and only 0.7% in the 36
th month of contribution. The same 
individual at 25 would have an expected hazard rate of 4.9% in the first month and 1.0% in the 
36
th month of contribution.  
 
Table 13 provides some simulated hazard rates of not contributing in a typical year. The 
average 40 years old men working in the private sector and belonging to the richest quintile has 
an expected hazard rate of about 6.8% in the first month and only 2.0% in the 36
th month he 
spends in the state “not contributing”. The same individual at 25 would have an expected 
hazard rate of 7.8% in the first month and 4.0% in the 36
th month in the state not contributing.  
 
The simulated hazard rates also indicate that lower income workers tend to have higher risk of 
leaving the state “contributing” and lower risk of leaving the state “not contributing”. 
Therefore, low income workers are less likely to contribute than high income workers because 
they have higher probabilities of leaving the state contributing and lower probabilities of 
entering this state. 
 
Workers in the public sector present higher hazard rates of not contributing than private 
workers. They also present lower hazard rates of contributing. Thus, public workers have higher 
probabilities of contributing than private workers because they have lower probabilities of 
leaving the state contributing and higher probabilities of entering into this state. 
 
Considering these results altogether, some distinctive patterns emerge. First, the hazard rate of 
both states decline with duration. As workers spend time in any of the two states, the chances of 
staying in the state rise. History and luck during the first periods in the state seem thus to be 
crucial for the fate of the working career. Second, young workers have higher risk of quitting 
the state contributing but also of quitting the state not contributing, i.e. they are more mobile. 
Third, economic downturns raise the risk that private workers stop contributing and reduce the 
chances that they start contributing. 
 
5.1.2  The simulations 
 
According to our estimations, there is a serious risk that a sizeable proportion of the workers 
registered in the work history records of the BPS will not be able to accumulate the 35 years of 
  13contribution required to be eligible for a pension when they reach the usual retirement ages. If 
the frequencies of monthly contributions observed between 1996 and 2004 remain unchanged, 
only about 21% of contributors will have made the required 35 years of contributions by the age 
of 60 and about 29% by the age of 65 (Table 14). The 35-years-of-contributions condition will 
be binding for a vast majority of contributors. 
 
As expected, the problem is more serious for women than men. While only 27% of women 
satisfy the requirements at 65, 34% of men manage to do so at the same age. These figures fall 
to 20% and 25%, respectively, at 60. 
 
Public employees are more likely to meet the requirements than private workers. Only 20% of 
men and 16% of women working in the private sector satisfy the access condition when they 
turn 65 years old. In contrast, 74% of men and 72% of women working in the public sector 
satisfy the condition at the same age.  
 
We have also found big differences between workers in different income brackets. Low-income 
workers are much less likely to meet the accessibility requirements than higher-income workers 
at any given age. In fact, private workers in the poorest quintile are practically out of the 
system. In contrast, 95% of the men and 86% of the women in the richest quintile working in 
the public sector would access a pension when they turn 65 years old.  
 
We also estimated the probability of accumulating 30 rather than 35 years of contribution at the 
retirement ages (Table 15). The difference between these two estimations provides a rough 
approximation to the direct impact on pension coverage of changing the minimum number of 
years of contribution required to access a pension. This measure does not take into account the 
indirect effects of such changes, though. It is possible, for example, that a reduction in the 
number of periods of contribution required to access a pension induce some workers to 
contribute less periods. It is also possible that an increase in the number of periods of 
contribution required to access a pension, like the one approved in 1995, provides incentives for 
some workers to contribute more periods. If this is the case, the total impact on coverage of 
changing this condition to access a pension will be lower than the direct impact estimated here. 
Therefore, the estimated difference between the probabilities of contributing 30 and 35 years at 
the retirement provide an upper bound to the total impact of this change. 
 
Given certain probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing, the 
proportion of individuals who accumulate 30 years of contributions is necessarily higher than 
the proportion of individuals who accumulate 35 years of contributions at any given age. If the 
density of contributions observed between 1996 and 2004 remain unchanged almost 35% and 
41% of the population registered in the labor history records will accumulate 30 years of 
contributions when they turn 60 and 65 years old, respectively (Table 15). The difference 
between the proportion of workers who would contribute 30 and 35 years is around 13 
percentage points for both ages considered. The difference is similar for men and women. 
Changes of the number of years of contribution required to access a pension seem to impact 
more strongly on individuals with high and medium densities of contribution than on 
individuals with low densities. Indeed, workers with very low densities of contributions are not 
likely to contribute either 30 or 35 years. 
 
  14According to these results, the increase in the vesting period passed in 1995 will likely cause a 
sizable decrease in the proportion of contributors who will fulfill this requirement.  This 
tightening of the conditions to access a  pension is therefore likely to cause a significant 
reduction in the proportion of individuals that can retire at any given age, and an increase in the 
average retirement age. Obviously, for these phenomena to take place, the social security 
administration has to actually check individual records of contributions and enforce the pension 
access conditions. This was not warranted in the past, but the ability of the administration to do 
it is growing gradually as information based on labor history records is being accumulated.  
 
The simulations are sensitive to the business cycle. We showed in the previous section that the 
unemployment rate impact on the hazard rates and hence the simulated work histories depend 
on the assumptions made about the unemployment rate. The simulations presented so far are 
based on the average unemployment rate in the period covered by the work history database, 
i.e. between April 1996 and December 2004, which was 13.45%. In order to analyze the 
sensitivity of the results to this variable, we estimated the proportion of workers who would 
accumulate 30 and 35 years of contribution with the unemployment rate at the 1981-2006 
average, which was 11.20% (tables 16 and 17). 
 
As expected, we find a higher proportion of workers accumulating the required years of 
contribution when we run the simulations with the lower unemployment rate. For example, the 
proportion of men in the private sector who would have accumulated 35 years of contribution at 
the age of 65 grows from 20 to 30% (tables 14 and 16). In the case of women, this figure would 
rise from 16 to 23%. However, the poorest workers are practically unaffected by the change in 
the unemployment rate. Most of them are basically out of the system with any of the two 
unemployment rates used in the simulations. The business cycle has a more significant impact 
on the work history of workers in higher quintiles of the distribution.  
 
The work histories of public employees do not seem to be very sensitive to the business cycle. 
The proportion of workers who accumulate 30 and 35 years of contribution at the retirement 
ages is very similar when the simulations are run with the two different unemployment rates. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that even though the densities of contribution would be higher in 
periods with “normal” unemployment rates than in the period in which the work history sample 
was taken, the proportion of workers who would comply with the required years of contribution 
at the usual retirement ages would still be very low. Running the simulations with the average 
unemployment rate of the last 25 years, we still get that only 30% of men and 23% of women 
would have accumulated 35 years of contribution at the minimum retirement age, i.e. at 60 
(table 16). 
 
The simulations presented so far were based on computations of the periods of service for 
regular jobs. There are some occupations that compute more than one period of service per 
period of effective contribution though. This is the case of most teachers and individuals 
working in risky activities. For example, workers handling radioactive substances register 3 
periods of service every 2 periods of effective contribution, and hence they are required to 
contribute a significantly smaller number of periods to be eligible for a pension. The special 
regimes are relatively frequent among some groups of public employees, but they are much less 
frequent among private employees. Hence we do not expect these regimes to have a significant 
  15impact on the estimations of the proportion of private employees who would qualify for a 
pension. Women in the richest quintile register the largest incidence of special regimes among 
private workers, and yet only around 3% of them have special bonuses for at least half of the 
time they have contributed. 
 
In contrast, over 30% of every income group of women working in the public sector has a 
special bonus at least half of the total time they have contributed. This figure exceeds 46% 
when it comes to women in the richest quintile. Workers that present the lowest incidence of 
these regimes in the public sector are men in the fourth highest quintile, and almost 12% of 
them work in activities with bonus for at least half of the time.  
 
We computed a proxy for the number of periods of service of public workers in activities with 
special bonuses. A worker who contributed one period in any of these activities will be granted 
more than one period of service (the exact number depending on the bonus legally attached to 
the activity). This correction of the original estimation increases the estimated proportion of 
public workers who would satisfy accessibility requirements for every subgroup of public 
employees. As expected, the difference between the estimations that take into account special 
bonus and those which do not is much bigger among women than men. The proportion of 
public workers who accumulate 35 years of contribution at 60 years old rises by 3.4 and 15.6 
percentage points, men and women respectively. In the case of women in the fourth highest 
quintile, the difference between the two estimations is as high as 25 percentage points at the age 
of 60 and 12 percentage points at the age of 65. These results suggest that special bonuses may 
have a great impact on the proportion of public workers who satisfy the accessibility conditions, 
in particular in the case of women. 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Large segments of Latin American population are not covered by the old-age pension programs. 
Some workers stay out of the system all their lives, never contributing or receiving pensions. 
Other workers contribute, but many of them do not reach the minimum number of periods of 
contribution required to qualify for a pension or for a minimum pension guarantee. There is 
increasing evidence of the existence of a significant number of workers making frequent 
transitions between formality and informality. Highly fragmented and incomplete histories of 
contribution to social security risk leaving these workers with no pension rights. This risk has 
probably been rising recently as the social security administrations have been increasing their 
ability to enforce the fulfillment of the qualifying conditions.  
 
We propose in this paper a methodology to estimate the proportion of workers who would 
accumulate the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension, and to assess the 
impact of different explanatory variables (like the business cycle) on the fulfillment of this 
condition. The estimation represents a significant challenge because the information that is 
currently available to estimate the number of periods of contribution of each worker is 
incomplete. We propose a two-steps methodology to overcome this difficulty. In the first step, 
we estimate the probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing at each 
age, using survival analysis. In the second step, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the 
histories of contribution using the probabilities of transition estimated in the first step.   
  16 
Using this methodology on a database of the main social security institution of Uruguay, the 
BPS, we found that the majority of contributors to this institution will not reach the required 
number of years of contribution to access a pension at the normal retirement age. Not at least if 
the current probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing remain in the 
future the same as in the period of observation (1996-2004). The required number of periods of 
contribution to access a pension in Uruguay is 35 years, which is unusually high for a 
developing country, but even when we estimate the proportion of contributors who would 
accumulate 30 years of contribution we get disappointingly low figures.  
 
As expected, the business cycle has a sizeable impact on the probabilities that a private worker 
transits between contributing and not contributing. This consideration might be particularly 
relevant in our case, because Uruguay went through one of the most severe recessions of its 
history during the period in which the work history database was built. Nevertheless, when we 
repeated the simulations using the average unemployment rate of a longer period (1981-2006) 
we still got that the majority of private workers would not accumulate the required 35 years of 
contribution at the normal retirement age (60 years).      
 
Incomplete and highly fragmented histories of contribution are much more pervasive among 
low than among high income workers. This is hardly surprising, but the size of the differences 
is really striking. Consider for example the case of men working in the private sector. They 
have almost a 64% chance of reaching the required 35 years of contribution at 65 years if they 
belong to the richest quintile, but only 1% chance if they belong to the poorest quintile. The 
same figures for women are 56% and 4% for the richest and poorest quintiles, respectively.    
 
These results suggest that this pension scheme requires some reform. In particular, the 
condition of having accumulated 35 years of contribution to access to a pension should be 
revised. 
 
Several social security systems in Latin America seem to be facing similar challenges as the 
BPS in Uruguay and have now similar databases as the one used in this paper. The densities of 
contribution estimated in previous studies for countries like Argentina and Chile are similar to 
the ones we found for Uruguay. But the densities of contribution alone do not tell us what the 
probability is that a worker qualifies for a pension when he reaches the retirement age. The 
methodology proposed in this paper to estimate these probabilities and the factors that impact 
on them might thus be useful to assess the situation in other countries of Latin America as well.  
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  20TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Number of individuals in the database 
Public Sector  Private Sector  Total  Generation 
Men Women Total  Men Women Total  Men Women Total 
1925-1930 109 35  144  339 158 497 448 193  641 
1931-1935 291 91  382  801 371 1,172 1,092 462  1,554 
1936-1940 534  236  770  1,517 855 2,372 2,051 1,091  3,142 
1941-1945 532  435  967  1,830 1,398 3,228 2,362 1,833  4,195 
1946-1950 577  611  1,188  2,235 1,786 4,021 2,812 2,397  5,209 
1951-1955 607  713  1,320  2,718 2,137 4,855 3,325 2,850  6,175 
1956-1960 767  842  1,609  3,066 2,626 5,692 3,833 3,468  7,301 
1961-1965 663  766  1,429  3,417 2,862 6,279 4,080 3,628  7,708 
1966-1970 414  577  991  3,684 3,146 6,830 4,098 3,723  7,821 
1971-1975 305  523  828  4,427 3,951 8,378 4,732 4,474  9,206 
1976-1978 146  281  427  3,154 2,642 5,796 3,300 2,923  6,223 
1979-1987 110  215  325  5,579 3,918 9,497 5,689 4,133  9,822 
Total 5,055  5,325  10,380  32,767 25,850 58,617 37,822 31,175  68,997 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the population in the database according to the proportion of 


















Total    41    14   7  10  28   100.0    59.8 
Sex 
Men    40    14   7  10  29   100.0    61.4 
Women    43    14   7   9  27   100.0    58.0 
Sector 
Public    13    8   5   7  67   100.0    85.4 
Private    46    15   8  10  21   100.0    55.3 
Income bracket 
Poorest  quintile    67    11   5   6  11   100.0    37.9 
2
nd quintile    52    15    7    8   18    100.0    50.7 
3
rd  quintile    41    17   9  10  23   100.0    59.4 
4
th  quintile    28    15   9  12  36   100.0    71.1 
Richest  quintile    17    12   8  11  52   100.0    80.4 
Note: Each bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
  21Table 3. Distribution of the population in the database according to the percentage of 
time in which the individuals contributed. Select ages.  

















20    72.6    10.8    4.7   3.5   8.4   100.0    30.2 
25   54.0    14.9    7.0    6.1    18.0    100.0    47.5 
30   40.2    12.5    7.0    7.9    32.4    100.0    59.9 
35   33.7    10.1    6.1    6.6    43.5    100.0    66.2 
40   30.0    8.6    5.0    6.3    50.1    100.0    70.1 
45   27.3    8.5    4.5    6.1    53.6    100.0    72.6 
50   25.2    7.5    4.5    6.1    56.7    100.0    74.7 
55   23.2    7.9    4.7    6.1    58.1    100.0    76.5 
Note: Each bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 











 -0.2894427   -0.1733976   -0.2329976   -0.3040770   -0.4348213  Log of duration 
*** *** *** ***  *** 
  0.0937066   -0.2099143   -0.1087928   -0.1651087   -0.2539522  Age 
**  *** *** ***  *** 
 0.0015901   0.0041604   0.0019068   0.0033169   0.0056954  Age
2
* *** * *** *** 
  0.0000095   -0.0000278   -0.0000111   -0.0000225   -0.0000414  Age
3
 ***   * *** 
  0.1175832   -0.1420757   -0.1039667   -0.1082590   -0.0567912  Log of duration * 
age 30 to 59  *** *** *** ***  *** 
  0.0768316   -0.0595662   -0.0587710   0.0789813   0.2642472  Log of duration * 
age 60+  ** *  * ** *** 
 0.8109195   2.7337720   3.1980562   5.2060900   7.7134725  Unemployment 
Rate    *** *** ***  *** 
  0.3849802   0.1205960   -1.2783098   -0.9505544   -0.5971543  Constant 
   ***  *  
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model 
for the state “contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested 
using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at 
the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 











 -0.3288185   -0.1423755   -0.2527221   -0.3045152   -0.4635652  Log of duration 
*** *** *** ***  *** 
 -0.2867760   -0.1992915   -0.1476158   -0.1825108   -0.1954506  Age 
*** *** *** ***  *** 
 0.0060549   0.0040793   0.0025086   0.0033899   0.0028882  Age
2
*** ***  *  **   
 -0.0000425   -0.0000286   -0.0000140   -0.0000195   -0.0000085  Age
3
*** **       
 -0.0813947   -0.1429265   -0.0985824   -0.1034000   -0.0198979  Log of duration * 
age 30 to 59  *** *** *** ***   
  0.1067427   -0.0652421   -0.0523352   -0.0094198   0.1603543  Log of duration * 
age 60+  **     ** 
  -1.0632649   -0.1813454   2.6109855   4.2608904   6.7140508  Unemployment 
Rate     ***  ***  *** 
  1.0930710   0.2825117   -0.5671934   -0.5644223   -0.6543332  Constant 
***       
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model 
for the state “contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested 
using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at 
the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
  
Table 6. Hazard rates of contributing.  Men, public sector. 
  First to third quintiles  Fourth quintile  Richest quintile 
 -0.3727189   -0.5196524  -0.4197703  Log of duration 
*** ***  *** 
  0.1439406   -0.1937280  -0.7369508  Age 
      *** 
  -0.0050416   0.0011224   0.0126937  Age
2
      *** 
 0.0000464   0.0000182    -0.0000535  Age
3
*     * 
 -0.1876139   -0.1255769  -0.1251013  Log of duration * age 30 to 59 
*** * * 
 0.1048698   0.1198424   0.0690889  Log of duration * age 60+ 
        
 -1.9631319   -7.5710245   1.2571905  Unemployment 
Rate     ***    
  -3.3626559   1.7447998   6.5513771  Constant 
*     *** 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model 
for the state “contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested 
using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at 
the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
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  First to third quintiles  Fourth quintile  Richest quintile 
 -0.4151730   -0.5243146  -0.3705551  Log of duration 
*** ***  *** 
 -0.0083652   -0.1476185  -0.6206072  Age 
   *** 
  -0.0009809   0.0007865   0.0109162  Age
2
   *** 
 0.0000139   0.0000166    -0.0000441  Age
3
    
 -0.1508591   -0.0584505  -0.1852682  Log of duration * age 30 to 59 
**   *** 
 -0.0825813    0.0370954  -0.1605181  Log of duration * age 60+ 
   * 
 -2.7404130   -5.4138448  -4.9070827  Unemployment 
Rate   ***  ** 
  -1.3561026   0.7599235   5.7893112  Constant 
   *** 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model 
for the state “contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested 
using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at 
the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 











 -0.1041627   -0.1529350   -0.1929391   -0.1797715   -0.1896528  Log of duration 
*** *** *** ***  *** 
 -0.0944476   -0.0353684   -0.0810192   -0.1428829   -0.2010818  Age 
**   *  **  ** 
 0.0031665   0.0012634   0.0029490   0.0042937   0.0054311  Age
2
***   **  ***  ** 
 -0.0000331   -0.0000150   -0.0000324   -0.0000434   -0.0000501  Age
3
*** * ***  ***  ** 
 -0.0493634   -0.0736875   -0.1153040   -0.1129735   -0.1591143  Log of duration * 
age 30 to 59  *** *** *** ***  *** 
  0.0058412   -0.1939569   -0.2200634   -0.4019849   -0.5466212  Log of duration * 
age 60+    *** *** ***  ** 
 -4.2159658   -6.9818616   -8.3620510   -8.5833914   -7.3123943  Unemployment 
Rate  *** *** *** ***  *** 
 -1.8366212   -1.4785787   -0.6600086    0.2700982    0.8917057  Constant 
*** ***       
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the 
state “not contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a 
likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard 
levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
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 -0.0359524   -0.1297845   -0.1447861   -0.1558657   -0.1745559  Log of duration 
*  *** *** ***  *** 
 -0.1981453   -0.1005464   -0.1011123   -0.3057562   -0.0926945  Age 
*** *  * ***     
 0.0059132   0.0027917   0.0029081   0.0089867   0.0021093  Age
2
*** *  * ***    
 -0.0000556   -0.0000261   -0.0000291   -0.0000864   -0.0000206  Age
3
*** **  ** ***     
 -0.0373614   -0.0662170   -0.0887558   -0.0808894   -0.1499035  Log of duration * 
age 30 to 59  *  *** *** ***  *** 
  0.0221732   -0.0774699   -0.0455249   0.0404465   -0.1036621  Log of duration * 
age 60+                
 -4.5108393   -7.8090439   -9.1639798   -8.3978575   -6.5399603  Unemployment 
Rate  *** *** *** ***  *** 
 -1.1470445   -0.9862775   -0.5565680    1.6332923   -0.4557131  Constant 
* *     **    
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the 
state “not contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a 
likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard 
levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
Table 10. Hazard rates of not contributing. Men, public sector.  
  First to third quintiles  Fourth quintile  Richest quintile 
 -0.1992291   -0.2915872  -0.2252352  Log of duration 
*** ***  ** 
 0.1074041   0.2929000   0.1454418  Age 
        
 -0.0007330   -0.0064759  -0.0045434  Age
2
        
  -0.0091990   0.0000297   0.0000304  Age
3
        
 -0.2233859   -0.0350227  -0.3123191  Log of duration * age 30 to 59 
***     ** 
 -0.4234219    0.0451607  -0.5037006  Log of duration * age 60+ 
*       
 -1.1692456   -4.7774109  -4.5383666  Unemployment 
Rate          
 -4.8210151   -5.5054553  -2.8916851  Constant 
** *     
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the 
state “not contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a 
likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard 
levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
  25Table 11. Hazard rates of not contributing. Women, public sector. 
  First to third quintiles  Fourth quintile  Richest quintile 
 -0.3168436   -0.2706937  -0.2462103  Log of duration 
*** ***  *** 
 0.2215887   0.8067520   1.0567885  Age 
   ***  *** 
 -0.0030227   -0.0191354  -0.0278665  Age
2
   ***  *** 
 0.0031970   0.0001387   0.0002164  Age
3
   ***  *** 
 -0.1607203   -0.2582388  -0.2046164  Log of duration * age 30 to 59 
** ***  * 
 -0.2455673   -0.6326308  -1.0714887  Log of duration * age 60+ 
   *    
 1.5727253   3.9966634    -1.9364036  Unemployment 
Rate     *    
  -6.3802454   -13.1087930   -14.0971390  Constant 
*** ***  *** 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the 
state “not contributing”. The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a 
likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard 
levels of significance in all the regressions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
Table 12. Simulated monthly hazard rates of contributing (%) 
  Age in years and Duration in months 
Category Age  =  25 
Duration = 1
Age = 25 
Duration=36
Age = 40 
Duration = 1
Age = 40 
Duration=36 
Men,  private  sector,  poorest  quintile    12.8   4.7   9.5   2.3 
Men,  private  sector,  2nd  quintile   7.2   3.9   4.7   1.6 
Men,  private  sector,  3rd  quintile   7.5   3.3   5.6   1.7 
Men,  private  sector,  4th  quintile   6.8   2.3   4.9   1.1 
Men,  private  sector,  richest  quintile   4.9   1.0   3.8   0.7 
Women,  private  sector,  poorest  quintile   9.9   3.2   6.4   1.5 
Women, private sector, 2
nd  quintile   7.0   4.3   4.8   1.8 
Women, private sector, 3
rd  quintile   7.5   3.1   4.9   1.4 
Women,  private  sector,  4th  quintile   6.3   2.1   4.3   1.0 
Women,  private  sector,  richest  quintile  5.0   1.0   3.0   0.5 
Men, public sector, 1st – 3rd quintiles    8.2    2.2    5.0    0.7 
Men,  public  sector,  4th  quintile   4.3   0.7   1.7   0.2 
Men, public sector, richest quintile    1.0    0.2    0.3    0.04 
Women, public sector, 1st – 3rd quintiles    9.3    2.2    6.3    0.8 
Women,  public  sector,  4th  quintile   5.3   0.8   2.8   0.4 
Women,  public  sector,  richest  quintile  1.4   0.4   0.6    0.09 
Note: These simulations have been done setting the unemployment rate at the April-1996-
December-2004 period average, which was 13.45%.  
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
  26Table 13. Simulated monthly hazard rates of not contributing (%) 
  Age in years and Duration in months 
Category Age  =  25 
Duration = 1 
Age = 25 
Duration=36 
Age = 40 
Duration = 1 
Age = 40 
Duration=36 
Men,  private  sector,  poorest  quintile   3.6   2.5   3.9   2.2 
Men,  private  sector,  2nd  quintile   6.2   3.6   6.1   2.7 
Men,  private  sector,  3rd  quintile   8.1   4.1   8.9   3.0 
Men,  private  sector,  4th  quintile   8.3   4.4   7.8   2.8 
Men,  private  sector,  richest  quintile   7.8   4.0   6.8   2.0 
Women,  private  sector,  poorest  quintile   2.0   1.8   2.3   1.7 
Women, private sector, 2
nd  quintile   3.9   2.5   3.8   1.9 
Women, private sector, 3
rd  quintile   5.1   3.1   4.6   2.0 
Women,  private  sector,  4th  quintile   5.5   3.2   5.5   2.4 
Women,  private  sector,  richest  quintile  6.8   3.7   4.9   1.6 
Men, public sector, 1st – 3rd quintiles    5.4    2.7    8.3    1.9 
Men,  public  sector,  4th  quintile   8.6       5.4   1.7 
Men, public sector, richest quintile    10.2    4.7    4.8    0.7 
Women, public sector, 1st – 3rd quintiles    8.1    2.7    13.4    2.6 
Women, public sector, 4th quintile    10.5    4.1    12.2    1.9 
Women,  public  sector,  richest  quintile   13.0   5.6   5.8   1.2 
Note: These simulations have been done setting the unemployment rate at the April-1996-December-
2004 period average, which was 13.45%.   
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
  27Table 14. Percentage of workers who contribute 35 or more years at the ages of 60 and 65 
in the simulations. Estimation using the average unemployment rate observed between 
1996 and 2004 (13.45%). 
   60 years old  65 years old 
Total   21.4    28.6 
Men   25.3    34.3 
Women   20.2    27.4 
Men, private sector    11.6    20.0 
Poorest quintile   0.1    1.0 
Second quintile   3.8    12.4 
Third quintile   6.2    16.3 
Fourth quintile   19.6    35.1 
Richest quintile   52.8    63.7 
Women, private sector    9.3    15.8 
Poorest quintile   1.0    3.5 
Second quintile   1.0    3.3 
Third quintile   4.2    11.8 
Fourth quintile   15.4    27.8 
Richest quintile   45.8    56.4 
Men public sector    67.2    74.3 
First to third quintile   17.1    35.3 
Fourth quintile   63.6    79.2 
Richest quintile   92.7    95.1 
Women public sector    58.1    72.1 
First to third quintile   16.9    39.8 
Fourth quintile   50.0    68.9 
Richest quintile   79.2    86.0 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
  28Table 15. Percentage of workers who contribute 30 or more years at the ages of 60 
and 65 in the simulations. Estimation using the average unemployment rate 
observed between 1996 and 2004 (13.45%). 
   60 years old  65 years old 
Total   34.7    41.0 
Men   40.4    48.8 
Women   33.9    39.9 
Men, private sector    26.9    36.4 
Poorest quintile   2.0    5.2 
Second quintile   19.1    32.6 
Third quintile   25.4    39.1 
Fourth quintile   48.7    59.8 
Richest quintile   73.6    78.8 
Women, private sector    20.6    28.5 
Poorest quintile   6.3    10.6 
Second quintile   5.9    12.9 
Third quintile   16.6    26.5 
Fourth quintile   38.4    48.9 
Richest quintile   66.5    72.0 
Men public sector    81.5    83.3 
First to third quintile   43.0    55.2 
Fourth quintile   84.3    88.4 
Richest quintile   96.7    97.0 
Women public sector    80.0    84.3 
First to third quintile   45.4    60.1 
Fourth quintile   79.7    83.6 
Richest quintile   92.9    93.3 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
  29Table 16. Percentage of workers who contribute 35 or more years at the ages of 60 
and 65 in the simulations. Estimation using the average unemployment rate observed 
between 1981 and 2006 (11.20%). 
   60 years old  65 years old 
Total   25.2    34.7 
Men   30.3    41.8 
Women   23.1    32.8 
Men, private sector    18.0    30.0 
Poorest quintile   0.2    1.1 
Second quintile   7.1    21.5 
Third quintile   11.8    29.3 
Fourth quintile   36.3    55.8 
Richest quintile   67.9    79.3 
Women, private sector    13.8    23.4 
Poorest quintile   1.2    4.0 
Second quintile   1.0    5.1 
Third quintile   8.2    21.6 
Fourth quintile   26.6    44.5 
Richest quintile   61.0    73.4 
Men public sector    68.2    74.6 
First to third quintile   16.5    34.9 
Fourth quintile   64.8    79.7 
Richest quintile   94.2    95.9 
Women public sector    55.2    69.4 
First to third quintile   14.3    35.6 
Fourth quintile   43.3    63.5 
Richest quintile   79.2    85.9 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
 
  30Table 17. Percentage of workers who contribute 30 or more years at the ages of 60 and 65 
in the simulations. Estimation using the average unemployment rate observed between 
1981 and 2006 (11.20%).  
   60 years old  65 years old 
Total   41.3    48.9 
Men   48.8    58.2 
Women   39.3    47.5 
Men, private sector    37.8    49.1 
Poorest quintile   2.1    5.6 
Second quintile   30.4    48.6 
Third quintile   41.6    59.1 
Fourth quintile   69.2    79.6 
Richest quintile   86.3    90.8 
Women, private sector    28.5    38.6 
Poorest quintile   7.1    11.9 
Second quintile   8.7    18.9 
Third quintile   29.1    44.1 
Fourth quintile   54.9    67.0 
Richest quintile   80.1    84.6 
Men public sector    82.1    83.8 
First to third quintile   42.1    54.9 
Fourth quintile   85.7    89.3 
Richest quintile   97.3    97.6 
Women public sector    77.1    82.1 
First to third quintile   40.7    55.8 
Fourth quintile   74.0    79.3 
Richest quintile   92.8    93.4 
Source: Authors’ computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
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Figure 1. Density of contribution and rate of employment 
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